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What is the state of EU environmental policy?
Environmental policy is an area of shared competence in the EU. Over time, with the 
growth in EU environmental legislation, more competence in internal policy measures 
has been moved to the EU level, while external representation in international 
environmental organisations and negotiations remains shared between the EU 
and member states. As many environmental problems are ‘collective’ or ‘commons’ 
problems, policy responses necessarily need the buy-in from a multitude of actors, 
often across borders in a regional or global context, to be effective (Hardin 1968).
EU environmental policy has become ever more ambitious since its beginnings in the 
1970s, at least until the mid-2000s (Haigh 2015). It moved member states towards 
adopting a precautionary approach to environmental protection, and promoted 
principles such as environmental policy integration across policy sectors for the 
pursuit of sustainable development (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Art. 11). 
The EU has also tried to upload these principles to the international level by means 
of its participation in many multilateral environmental agreements. Results of more 
than forty years of EU environmental policy have shown marked improvements in 
the quality of the environment and reductions in pollution (EEA 2016). Key early 
environmental policy measures that still form a strong base in EU policy include 
the Birds and Habitats Directives (adopted in 1979 and 1992 respectively). In the 
UK, the implementation of these Directives led to the establishment of 620 ‘Special 
Protected Areas’, 31 ‘Sites of Community Importance’ and 270 ‘Special Areas of 
Conservation’, including both land and marine protected sites.1  EU environmental 
policy only expanded and grew over the years, with measures on water quality and 
management, chemicals management, noise pollution, environmental assessment, 
air pollution, waste management, marine protection, biodiversity protection and 
climate change being added to the portfolio. Overall, policy measures increased in 
number and, usually also, in ambition.
The continued high ambition of EU environmental policy was stalled somewhat in 
the wake of the 2008 economic and financial crises. Member states with pressing 
unemployment, debt, and competitiveness concerns became less interested and less 
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pressured to move forward on innovative and far-reaching environmental policy 
measures (Dupont & Oberthür 2016). Nevertheless, the EU as a whole remains a 
leading actor in many environmental policy areas, and has been striving to be 
an international leader on climate change, in particular, since the early 1990s 
(Groen 2015). This international stance has helped keep climate change on the 
agenda. It resulted in active EU diplomacy in the run up to the Paris climate 
change negotiations in December 2015. These negotiations culminated in the 
Paris Agreement, which can be considered a success. The Agreement includes calls 
for higher ambition to keep global temperature increase well below 2°C, or even 
1.5°C, compared to pre-industrial levels. The success of the Paris negotiations is 
partly thanks to the EU’s diplomatic efforts, and can also be considered a win for 
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the EU’s leadership role on climate change (Oberthür and Groen forthcoming).
Despite these improvements, much remains to be done across the environmental 
field (notably in air, water and soil quality, in transitioning away from fossil fuels 
in a timely enough fashion, and in the protection of ecosystems) to protect and 
improve the quality of the environment (EEA 2016). The underlying philosophy of 
EU environmental policy has changed over time, with narratives justifying action 
based on balances between ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ gradually displacing the lauded 
precautionary approach (Gollier & Treich 2003). This has led to a situation where 
environmental policymakers need to demonstrate multiple (economic) benefits 
to justify taking action.
Finally, the growth of the EU’s environmental policy has often been a centre-
point for the development of policy in other sectors (such as energy), leading 
to ever more environmental policy measures. It is a prime example of how 
policy sectors are intertwined. Environmental policy objectives also need to be 
taken into account in the development of policies in other sectors (for example 
through green budgeting, which uses environmental criteria to allocate a budget 
in a certain policy area) (Jordan & Lenschow 2010). As such, EU environmental 
policy has sometimes provided a hook for spillover developments in closely 
interconnected policy fields (Haigh 2015). EU climate policy, for example, has 
become ‘climate and energy’ policy (Oberthür & Pallemaerts 2010; Jordan et al. 
2010). Considering the challenges of climate change and energy supply, such 
interconnections make sense, but also result in increased perceptions of ‘Brussels’ 
driving policy in member states, although EU policy is anyway negotiated among 
member states themselves.
What is the UK’s role in EU environmental policy?
When the UK entered the EU in the early 1970s, environmental policy was largely 
untouched at EU level, and national governments were in charge of the field. 
The UK was developing policies in response to its own environmental problems 
(like air pollution issues as demonstrated by the ‘Great Smog’ of 1952). However, 
environmental issues are complex interconnections of human activity across 
borders. Transboundary cooperation – at the EU and international levels – grew 
in the following decades, with international agreements on acid rain (the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution), ozone layer protection 
(the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 
Montreal Protocol) and on climate change (the 1992 UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol), for example, to which the UK 
(and the EU) are parties (Burns et al. 2016). 
EU policy developments often responded to the international agenda on 
environmental policy governance by implementing specific measures to tackle 
an issue. Increasingly (since the 1990s), however, the EU has helped to set the 
agenda at international level and has also developed original policy frameworks 
that set unofficial standards or that have been taken up in other jurisdictions 
(such as the REACH legislation on chemicals) (Biedenkopf 2012). Thus, the EU has 
increasingly aimed to ‘lead by example’ in international environmental policy, 
by both agreeing to stringent commitments internationally and developing 
ambitious policy measures internally to meet or surpass these commitments 
(Oberthür & Roche Kelly 2008).
From being ambivalent towards environmental action in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the UK was dubbed the ‘dirty man of Europe’, the UK moved to becoming 
an environmental actor within the EU. It adapted its own environmental 
governance structures in response to EU developments and also increasingly 
shaped the form and stringency of EU environmental policy (Burns et al. 2016). 
It pushed for environmental policies that were aligned with the UK’s vision 
of a free market economy. The UK became a leader within the EU on climate 
change and was instrumental in driving the development of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions trading within the EU in response to climate change (leading to 
the adoption of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme). The UK today is part of the 
pro-climate action ‘Green Growth Group’ of member states and is generally a 
leading member state on environmental action. The UK pushed for agreement on 
a target to reduce GHG emissions in the EU by 20 per cent by 2020 in 2007 and 
for agreement on a target to reduce emissions by 40 per cent by 2030 (Jordan 
et al. 2010; Dupont & Oberthür 2015). It has also done well out of a number 
of EU policies on the environment, for example on marine issues. As a state 
with a large coastline and significant marine resources, the UK benefits from 
the EU’s marine strategy framework Directive, the maritime spatial planning 
Directive and other instruments that outline a common legal framework for the 
sustainable development of maritime industries, such as offshore wind energy 
and the fishing and aquaculture industries.
More recently, the UK has also been a driving force behind the EU’s turn towards 
better regulation (REFIT – regulatory fitness), which, from the perspective of 
environmental policy, often means ‘less policy’. The understanding of ‘better 
regulation’ stemmed from the review of the Lisbon Strategy to 2020 (in 2005) 
and focused on regulatory impacts on jobs and growth, while ignoring the 
importance of sustainable development for achieving such goals. Much of 
the EU’s environmental policy has come under question under this push, with 
established policy measures under threat of being reopened for negotiation and 
watered down, and proposed measures being weakened or withdrawn (Wilkinson 
et al. 2005; Radaelli 2007; Taylor et al. 2012). At international level, the UK has 
acquired a prominent role in shaping EU external environmental and climate 
policy and diplomacy. Building on its strong diplomatic network across the 
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world and its wealth of diplomatic experience and expertise, it has been able to 
shape European environmental diplomacy in the EU’s ‘Green Diplomacy Network’ 
and beyond, while also benefitting from the capacities of other member states 
(e.g. special external relations of France, Spain and others). In doing so, it has 
contributed to, and benefitted from, enhanced EU influence through the pooling 
of resources by EU member states, including in climate geopolitics (Oberthür 
2016). A major source of the EU’s international influence has been ambitious 
internal policy and thus ‘leadership by example’ based on the EU’s ‘market’ 
and ‘regulatory power’ (Damro 2015). Overall, coordination of international 
environmental policy and diplomacy within the EU has been a win-win for the 
UK and the EU.
What are the potential implications of a ‘Brexit’ scenario?
In the case of a Brexit scenario, we can hypothesise that there would 
be implications on 1) the UK’s environmental policy standards, 2) the 
EU’s environmental policies and 3) the strength and influence of both 
the UK and the EU in developing international environmental standards.
First, the UK’s own environmental standards may be affected. Many 
environmental NGOs and experts suggest that if the UK were to leave the EU, 
its own environmental policies and standards would be compromised, especially 
over the longer term.2 Today the general contours of national environmental 
policy are agreed first in concert at the EU level. We could thus assume that 
with Brexit, as the UK will no longer be bound by these policy developments, it 
may choose to water down or abandon a number of measures that are perceived 
as too costly. However, there are alternatives to such a scenario. We could also 
envision that national policymaking procedures may allow the UK to have more 
freedom to adopt environmental policies that are ambitious, and that can be 
adopted and implemented more swiftly than at the EU level. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that where environmental protection measures are costly upfront, acting 
alone would be more difficult than acting collectively. At present, member states 
within the EU are anyway permitted to adopt more stringent measures in several 
areas of environmental policy.3 We could also envision that future UK national 
environmental policies will be more linked to the specific national and local 
environmental problems, with adaptation to negative impacts becoming ever 
more important. A last possibility is that the UK would anyway (need to) take 
on the environmental policies and standards of the EU, especially related to 
product standards or process impacts, given that trade in products with the EU 
will remain a key part of the UK’s economy whether it is in or out of the EU. 
Furthermore, effective environmental policies often require a multitude of (cross-
border) implementing actors. The UK will also be a party to various international 
environmental agreements that will to some extent limit its room for manoeuvre 
if it decides to roll back its environmental policy ambition – environmental 
agreements that anyway inspired or required some EU environmental policies.
Second, for the EU, the exit of the UK may lead to a readjustment of the 
coalitions within the Council. At present, the UK is a member of the Green 
Growth Group, which regularly supports action to protect the environment, 
and, in particular, to combat climate change. Without this influential member, 
the strength of the group is likely to decline in face of mounting influence of 
less enthusiastic member states. This thus could lead to a situation where EU 
environmental policy itself becomes less ambitious, with more discretion given 
to member states to implement overarching environmental ‘objectives’ as they 
see fit. Competing priorities may pull attention away from environmental issues. 
An example of how new internal (less ambitious) coalitions may impact the 
strength and success of EU environmental policy can be seen in the proposed 
framework for climate and energy policies to 2030 (European Council 2014). In 
this case, member states have agreed to one EU-level binding target for reducing 
GHG emissions by 40 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, combined with 
an EU-wide renewable energy share target of at least 27 per cent (no longer 
including binding targets for each member state as was the case in 2009), 
and a non-binding commitment of at least 27 per cent improvement in energy 
efficiency by 2030. Given that the EU has already achieved about 24 per cent 
GHG emission reductions in 2014 (EEA 2015), and is also set to achieve more than 
20 per cent share of renewable energy by 2020, the suggested targets do not 
demonstrate the level of ambition that one could expect from an international 
leader on climate change. Without the UK pushing for ambitious measures, 
the EU may struggle even to achieve the targets already agreed in 2014.
Third, the UK and the EU would both likely see a decline in their influence 
in global environmental governance. This decline could stem from their 
relative reduced weight, but the risk of weaker policies in both the EU and 
UK would also hamper leadership, which often emanates from the ability 
to demonstrate successful domestic policy measures. Overall, the EU and 
UK may also lose out on the opportunities presented by the transition to 
a low-carbon economy, including technological development, the opening 
of new markets and heightened research expertise in a growing economic 
sector. The EU allows for ease of research cooperation across borders and 
the single market boosts opportunities for trade in innovative products.
These hypotheses are not the only options that can been visaged under a Brexit 
scenario. Environmental policy ambition may increase as environmental and 
climate crises become more acute, but it is more likely that the increase in 
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ambition both within the EU and the UK would be lower and slower than if the 
UK remains an active  EU member, where  it can  push for  and be pushed by 
sufficient collective action.    
Endnotes 
1. http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-23 and http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-1399, accessed 29 
February 2016.
2. http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/page_2040.php, accessed 26 February 2016.
3. Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU: ‘The protective measures 
adopted pursuant to Article 192 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with 
the Treaties. They shall be notified to the Commission.’
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